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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED RECOLLECTION
INTRODUCTION
Since the French government first recognized the legal im-
portance of hypnosis nearly two centuries ago,' hypnosis has
gradually emerged from the "baquets"2 and dark rooms of mes-
merism to have a significant impact on our modern legal system. 3
Hypnotism is currently considered by law enforcement officials
as an invaluable investigative 4 and rehabilitative' tool. Yet our
courts have been reluctant to accept hypnosis as a means of assist-
ing a witness. As stated by the court in People v. Ebanks,6 the
first reported American case involving hypnosis, "[t]he law of the
I In 1784, the French government appointed a commission, headed by Benjamin
Franklin, to investigate "mesmerism," the controversial suggestive technique that pre-
cursed hypnotism, and its founder, Franz Anton Mesmer. K. BOWERS, HYPNOSIS FOR THE
SERIOUSLY CURIOUS 7-8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BowERS]. See notes 15 and 16 infra and
the accompanying text for further discussion of "mesmerism."2
"Baquets" were the wooden tubs used by Mesmer to create the magnetic field
necessary for his hypnotic cure, "animal magnetism." See note 15 infra for a discussion of
"animal magnetism."
3 Evidence of this impact is Found in the recent proliferation of cases and literature
discussing hypnosis. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1006 (1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v.
Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Modesto,
382 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1963); People v. Busch, 366 P.2d 314 (Cal. 1961); People v. Hiser, 72
Cal. Rptr. 906 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848 (I1. App. Ct. 1979); Harding v. State,
246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v.
McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 1978); State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1950); Jones
v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Harris, 405 P.2d 492 (Or. 1965);
State v. Jorgensen, 492 P.2d 312 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Pierce, 207 S.E.2d 414
(S.C. 1974); W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS (1962) [hereinafter cited as BRYAN];
Spector & Foster, The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the Trial Process: Reflec-
tions on People v. Smrekar, 10 LoY. CHI. L.J. 691 (1978-79); Spector & Foster, Admissibil-
ity of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIo Sr. L.J. 567
(1977); Comment, Refreshing the Memory of a Witness Through Hypnosis, 5 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. REV. 266 (1976).
4 See W. KROGER, CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 113-18 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as KROGER]; Holden, Forensic Use of Hypnosis on the Increase, 208
SCIENCE 1443 (June 27, 1980).
5 See BRYAN, supra note 3, at 266-67.
6 49 P. 1049 (Cal. 1897).
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United States does not recognize hypnotism."7
Hypnotically induced evidence has nevertheless been pre-
sented to the courts in several forms. 8 Generally, courts have
found testimony by a lay witness hypnotized on the stand, and
expert testimony of statements made by a subject while under
hypnosis, inadmissible. 9 The propriety of these principles is,
however, beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment
will, instead, address the issues surrounding the admissibility of
in-court testimony of a lay witness whose memory has been re-
freshed by a pre-trial hypnotic session.10 Generally considered
admissible, such testimony was found inadmissible in two recent
decisions, State v. Mack" and State v. Hurd. l2This Comment
will consider the rationale of those decisions and will recommend
that, with proper safeguards, hypnotically induced recall should
be admitted into evidence by courts.
I. HYPNOSIS: GENERAL INFORMATION 13
A. History of Hypnosis
7 Id. at 1053 (quoting lower court opinion).
8 The primary evidentiary uses of hypnosis include the assistance of expert testi-
mony by contributing to a more comprehensive psychological evaluation, and the assis-
tance of lay testimony by enabling witnesses to recall seemingly forgotten observations and
other information. For a more detailed discussion of the legal uses of hypnosis, see notes
31-34 infra and the accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976) (defendant
had no constitutional right to testify while in an hypnotic trance); People v. Busch, 366
P.2d 314 (medical doctor not allowed to testify as to defendant's frame of mind where
opinion was based on statements made by defendant while hypnotized); People v. Hiser,
72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (within discretion of trial judge not to admit tape recording of hypnotic
interviews); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903 (hypnotist could not testify as to statements
made by defendant while hypnotized); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (statements made by
defendant while hypnotized and expert testimony based on those statements inadmissi-
ble); State v. Pierce, 207 S.E. 2d 414 (statements made by hypnotized defendant could not
be presented by hypnotist) See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R. 3d. 442 (1979).
'0 Though both of the principal cases of this Comment are criminal cases involving
testimony of crime victims, as opposed to occurrence witnesses, the author does not feel
that it is necessary to treat testimony of the two types of witnesses differently. The possibil-
ity of prejudicial testimony by either type of witness does not run to admissibility, but
rather bears on the credibility to be afforded the testimony by the jury. Similarly, the
author does not distinguish between the use of hypnotic evidence in criminal and civil
trials. Though the standard of proof may differ, the same admissibility standard, that is,
relevancy, applies in both types of trials.
11292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
12 414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), af'd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
13 An exhaustive examination of the history and theory of hypnosis is beyond the
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While the importance of the power of suggestion can be
traced to primitive medicine men, voodoo practitioners,
Egyptian ceremonies, Hindu sacred rites and even to the Bible, 14
the modem era of hypnosis did not begin until the eighteenth
century. Around 1780, in France, Franz Anton Mesmer began
attracting followers and attention with his unusual method of
cure, which he called "animal magnetism."' 5 As this technique
gained recognition, the French government grew suspicious and
appointed a royal commission to investigate Mesmer and his
work. The commission's findings discredited Mesmer, sending
mesmerism underground until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury when it resurfaced under the new title of "hypnotism.."16
With the turn of the twentieth century, and the realization that
hypnosis was psychologically rather than physically based, the
hypnotic phenomenon slowly began to gain acceptance.17 Today,
hypnosis is recognized chiefly as a therapeutic tool in medicine
and psychiatry, 18 but the realm of its use extends to areas such as
scope of this Comment. For such an examination, see BowEns, supra note 1; BRYAN, supra
note 3; KROGER, supra note 4.
14 S. KREBS, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HYPNOSIS 3-4 (rev. ed. 1957); KRO-
CER, supra note 4; Pattie, A Brief History of Hypnosis, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL AND Ex-
PERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 10 (J. Gordon ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as GORDON].
15 "Animal magnetism" was ordinarily performed in "an atmosphere of heavily
draped rooms and soft music." BoWERS, supra note 1, at 7-8. Metal bars were extended
from a wooden tub, or baquet, filled with water, ground glass, iron filings and, supposed-
ly, magnetism. This magnetism presumably flowed through the iron bar into the body of
the patient holding it. This process was designed to in some manner realize the person's
magnetic imbalances and to have a "benign and healing effect on the body." Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 8-9.
17 Lay acceptance of hypnosis has been retarded significantly by several misconcep-
tions which, although still believed by many, have no basis in fact. First, it is often be-
lieved that the hypnotic subject loses consciousness while under hypnosis. This is untrue,
however, since all stages of the hypnotic process are characterized by increased attention.
Second, it is often believed that the subject is unable to make decisions while hypnotized.
Since the capacity to be hypnotized is a subjective experience, however, hypnosis is not ac-
companied by surrender of willpower. Third, many laymen associate hypnosis with weak-
mindedness. This is also a fallacy since people of above average intelligence make the best
subjects and even constant hypnotic induction does not weaken the mind. Fourth, many
subjects fear that intimate secrets will be revealed while under hypnosis. This fear is un-
founded because the hypnotized person will be aware of everything, both while under
hypnosis and afterwards, unless amnesia is suggested by the hypnotist. Finally, the fear of
remaining under the influence of hypnosis often causes resistance to hypnotism. This fear
is also unwarranted since the subject actually induces the hypnosis himself and can there-
fore readily dehypnotize himself. See KROGER, supra note 4, at 36-37.
18 In 1958, the Council of Mental Health of the American Medical Association issued
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sports,' 9 education 2 and law enforcement.2'
B. The Process of Hypnosis
The phenomenon of hypnosis has never been precisely de-
fined22 nor adequately explained. 23 Generally, however, hypnosis
can be described as a process through which one attains a
heightened degree of concentration and suggestibility without a
loss of consciousness. The hypnotized subject does not pass into a
sharply delineated or static hypnotic state,24 but passes through
several states, or "depths," each having its own characteristics.25
a qualified endorsement of hypnosis: "The use of hypnosis has a recognized place in the
medical armamentarium and is a useful technique in the treatment of certain illnesses
when employed by qualified medical and dental personnel." Council on Mental Health,
Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 187 (1958). Hypnosis has been used in the treat-
ment of various illnesses and addictions, including: smoking, asthma, burns, chronic pain,
grief, impotency, obesity, migraine and tension headaches and warts. See BOwERS, supra
note 1, at 141-51.
19 See Unestal, Hypnotic Preparation of Athletes, in HYPNOSIS 1979, at 301 (1979).
20 See PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1980, at 22.
21 See KROGER, supra note 4, at 115-17; Holden, supra note 4; TIME, Sept. 13, 1976,
at 56.
22 "[T]here are as many definitions of hypnosis as there are definers." KROGER, supra
note 4, at 26. The American Medical Association has endorsed the British Medical Associ-
ation's definition of hypnosis, which describes it as:
[A] temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which may be in-
duced by another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear
spontaneously or in response to verbal or other stimuli. These phenomena in-
clude alterations in consciousness and memory, increased susceptibility to sug-
gestion, and the production in the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to
him in his usual state of mind.
Council on Mental Health, supra note 18, at 186-87. Hypnosis is defined "operationally as
the set of events that a consensus of hypnotists reports are hypnotic." London, The Induc-
tion of Hypnosis, in GORDON, supra note 14, at 44-45.
23 For a brief discussion of the various theoretical explanations of the hypnotic phe-
nomenon, see KROGER, supra note 4, at 26-32.
24 Id. at 32.
2 A more developed explanation of the various levels of trance follows:
The hypnotic state may be separable into six depths, or levels, of trance.
Each level is distinguishable by a set of characteristic mental and physical acts
that the subject is capable of performing at that level. The characteristic acts
become more difficult to fake as the depth of the trance increases. In the first
and second stages, the so-called "hypnoidal" stage or light trance, only localized
catalepsies are demonstrated. For example, if the operator suggests that the sub-
ject will be unable to open his eyes, the subject will be unable to open his eyes.
At this stage the subject experiences physical relaxation, often accompanied by
fluttering of the eyelids, deep and slow breathing, and a progressive deepening
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Gradually, the subject becomes more submissive to the sugges-
tions of the hypnotist, but retains his will-power and remains
aware of the actions of the hypnotist. 26 Susceptibility to hypnotic
suggestion varies from one subject to the next, depending upon
such factors as the individual's age, intelligence, ability to restrict
attention and motivation.27
Among the several methods of hypnotically inducing recall,28
two techniques, revivification and hypermnesia, are especially
useful in refreshing the memory of a witness. Revivification al-
lows the hypnotized person with a complete failure of recall to
"relive" earlier events, exactly as they happened, and to describe
the events in detail." Hypermnesia, on the other hand, is used to
retrieve information at a greater than volitional level when a
subject remembers portions of an incident, but is unsure of de-
tails. 30
C. Hypnosis and the Law
The use of hypnotically induced recall is very controversial
both because of the subject's heightened susceptibility to sugges-
of muscular lethargy. In the third and fourth stages, the so-called "medium"
trance, the subject experiences various degrees of analgesia: though the sense of
touch is retained, the subject feels no pain. Also in the fourth stage the subject
will be incapable of remembering that which the operator suggests he will be
unable to remember. In the fifth stage, a "deep" or "heavy" trance, the subject
is capable of positive hallucinations upon suggestion and experiences neither
touch nor pain. Finally, in the sixth stage of hypnosis, the subject is capable of
negative hallucination: upon suggestion he is unable to perceive objects that are
actually present.
Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Suscepti-
ble?, supra note 3, at 571-72 (citations omitted).
2 See KoGEa, supra note 4, at 36-37.
7 Hilgard, Individual Differences in Hypnotizability, in GORDON, supra note 14, at
391. In fact, it has been stated that "modem investigators have established beyond any
doubt that people differ considerably in their hypnotic susceptibility." BOWERS, supra note
1, at 62.
2 For a discussion of the various techniques used to induce the hypnotic state, see
KROcER, supra note 4, at 11-22.
29 Revivification is often confused with age regression. The two concepts are, how-
ever, distinguishable. In age regression, sometimes referred to as pseudorevivification, the
hypnotized subject plays a role rather than actually reliving the event. Age regression can
be further described as a simulated pattern of acting out the past events in the framework
of the present. Id. at 16.
3 Id.
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tion,31 and because it is possible for the hypnotized person to
"misremember" or deliberately fabricate material. 32 While these
problems accompany every interrogative procedure to an extent,
they are especially troublesome in the case of hypnosis. For this
reason, certain safeguards, such as full disclosure of any hypnotic
procedures used,1 and cautionary instructions as to the inherent
weaknesses of hypnosis,34 should accompany any testimony
which has been induced by hypnosis. These safeguards would en-
able a jury to assess the credibility of a witness and to weigh his
testimony properly.
II. HYPNOSIS AND PRESENT MEMORY REFRESHED
From 1968 through 1979, twelve cases considered the admis-
sibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony.s Each one of the
courts reasoned that prior hypnotism of a witness should not ren-
der testimony inherently untrustworthy and inadmissible, but
should only affect the credibility to be afforded the testimony by
the trier of fact. 3 Without exception, the courts viewed the testi-
mony as a product of the present memory of the witness as re-
freshed by hypnosis.
The principle of present memory refreshed, which allows the
31 In fact, some have argued that "from the point of view of an onlooker, there is no
aspect of hypnosis more striking than the heightened suggestibility of a hypnotic subject.
Indeed, this characteristic is so salient that hypnosis is frequently defined as a state of
hypersuggestibility ..... BOWERs, supra note 1, at 85.
32 KROCER, supra note 4, at 16-17.
3 Failure to disclose that the witness had been previously hypnotized led to reversal
in two cases, despite the courts' general recognition of the admissibility of hypnotically in-
duced recall. See United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825; Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp.
1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
34 See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506; Harding v. State, 246 A.2d
302.
3 United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667; United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193;
Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067; Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506;
United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825; Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025; Creamer
v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. 1974); People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848; Harding v.
State, 246 A.2d 302; State v. McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414; State v. Brom, 494 P.2d 434 (Or.
Ct. App. 1972); State v. Jorgenson, 492 P.2d 312.
36 See, e.g., 244 S.E.2d at 427-28. In two cases, United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d
825, and Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, the testimony was rendered inadmissible
by the proponents' failure to disclose that the witness had been subjected to hypnosis in
preparation for trial. It should also be noted that corroboration of the proffered testimony
has been cited as a supporting factor in finding the hypnotically induced recall admissible.
[Vol. 70
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refreshing of the memory of a witness who once had knowledge
of a matter, is firmly established in the law of every jurisdiction.37
Since recollection is one of the essential elements in a properly
qualified testimonial statement,s some manner of memory re-
freshment is often necessary in order to introduce testimony.
Traditionally, courts have solved this problem by allowing the
witness to refer to memoranda or other writings in order to
"spark" his memory.39
If satisfied that a witness lacks effective recollection, 40 courts
are very liberal as to what may be used to refresh the witness'
memory. 4' Virtually any writing, admissible or inadmissible,
See, e.g., 385 N.E.2d at 855. It would seem, however, that corroboration should be a fac-
tor to consider in determining the weight to be given the testimony, and not in determin-
ing its admissibility. This is especially true where the testimony of the previously hypno-
tized witness is the first evidence offered.
37 See 81 AM. Jun. 2d Witnesses § 438 (1976).
-8 The three essential elements are observation, recollection and communication. See
3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 725 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIc-
MORE].
39 Refreshing memory in this matter is based on a theory of memory known as the
"law of association." The recall of any part of a past experience tends to bring with it other
parts that were in the same field of awareness, and a new experience tends to stimulate the
recall of other like experiences. Thus, given the proper stimulus, the witness will recognize
as familiar what he had forgotten, and the gap between observation and communiction
will be filled. See C. McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMIcK].
It should be noted that there is an important distinction between the concepts of
present memory refreshed and past recollection recorded. Present memory refreshed is
"that present actual recollection which a witness on the stand may ordinarily be expected
to exhibit." 3 WIcMORE, supra note 38, at § 725. Past recollection recorded, on the other
hand, is "that recollection which once existed, but now, having irrevocably vanished, de-
pends on artificial preservation." Id. The distinction is recognized in modem evidence law
and is therefore important, since, in the former situation, the witness testifies from his
memory as refreshed and his testimony is what he says, while in the latter, the testimony is
the recorded recollection itself. See MCCORMICK, supra, at § 9. It should also be noted that
there is a general preference among the courts for present memory refreshed testimony.
This is evidenced by the fact that most courts will admit a memorandum of past recollec-
tion into evidence only if the witness has no present recollection. Furthermore, most courts
require that the memorandum of past recollection must have been written by the witness
or examined and found correct by him and that it was made promptly after the events re-
corded so that the recollection was fresh when written. See generally id. at §§ 299-303; 3
WIGMORE, supra note 38, at §§ 734-55.
40 Before refreshment will be allowed it must be established that the witness is in fact
in need of refreshing his memory. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 758, at 126 n.3.
41 See, e.g., Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926). That court stated:
[lit is quite immaterial by what means the memory is quickened; it may be a
song, or a face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some character. It is suffi-
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original or a copy, may be used to refresh memory,42 and it mat-
ters neither when nor by whom the writing was made. 43
In contrast to this liberality, a court may limit the use of pres-
ent memory refreshed in two principal ways. First, it is within
the court's discretion to declare a particular writing improper for
refreshing a witness' memory. 44 For this purpose, the trial judge
must determine whether the nature of an instrument, or the cir-
cumstances under which it was created, render its use improp-
er. 45 Second, when a witness refers to a memorandum, the ad-
verse party is entitled to inspect the memorandum, to have it
available for his use during cross-examination, and to have it
submitted to the jury. 46 This practice allows the adverse party to
question, and the jury to weigh, the credibility of the witness'
claim that his memory has been refreshed. Both of these safe-
guards would be available when a witness submits to hypnosis
for memory refreshment. The court would still be able to exercise
its discretion to avoid abuse of the procedure, and all parties and
the trier of fact would have access to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the hypnotic session. 47 Only when all parties know
who was present at the interview, what questions were asked
and what responses were given, can the jury effectively deter-
mine the weight to be given the hypnotically induced evidence.
III. HYPNOSIS AND THE FRYE RULE
Recently, two state courts have varied from the traditional
cient that by some mental operation, however mysterious, the memory is
stimulated to recall the event, for when so set in motion it functions quite in-
dependently of the actuating cause.
Id. at 956.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 538 F.2d 724 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1023 (1976); MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 9; 3 WIcMoRE, supra note 38, at §§
758-61.
43 See, e.g., Sowders v. Coleman, 4 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1928).
44 3 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 758, at 126 n.3.
45 The trial judge may, in fact, reject the testimony by holding that the witness is not
lacking in memory, that the writing does not refresh his memory or that the danger of un-
due suggestion outweighs the probative value of the testimony. See McConImCK, supra
note 39, at § 9.
46 See id.; 3 WIGMORE, supra note 38, at §§ 762-64. This safeguard is embodied in
rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
47 One court suggested that, "at a minimum, complete stenographic records [of the
hypnotic interview] should be maintained." United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d at 199 n.12.
[Vol. 70
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"present memory refreshed" approach to find hypnotically in-
duced recollection inadmissible. In State v. Mack, 48 and State v.
Hurd,49 the courts declined to analogize a pre-trial hypnotic ses-
sion to a memory enhancing writing. Instead, those courts
viewed hypnotically induced recall as data gathered in scientific
experiments and, therefore, would require for admissibility that
the testimony meet the standard for scientific evidence estab-
lished in Frye v. United States. 0 The Frye standard requires that
the scientific principle from which the evidence is deduced (in
this case, hypnosis) must have crossed "the line between ... ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages" and "be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."' 5 On close analysis, application of the Frye
rule to hypnotically induced recall in the Mack and Hurd cases
appears inappropriate.
An audio or video recording of the interview would be helpful.
48 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
49 414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
50 293F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51 Id. at 1014. The Frye rule has come under recent attack. In State v. Williams, 388
A.2d 500 (Me. 1978), the Supreme Court of Maine rejected the Frye court's imposition of
an additional, independently controlling standard for determining admissibility above
and beyond relevancy and assistance to the trier of fact, and allowed expert testimony
based on speech spectrography, or "voice print" analysis. The court stated:
[Tihe presiding Justice will be allowed a latitude, which the Frye rule denies, to
hold admissible in a particular case proffered evidence involving newly ascer-
tained, or applied, scientific principles which have not yet achieved general ac-
ceptance in whatever might be thought to be the applicable scientific communi-
ty, if a showing has been made which satisfies the Justice that the proffered evi-
dence is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant.
Id. at 504. The Williams decision was based on evidentiary rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which make no reference to "general scientific acceptance" and pro-
vide: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702. McCormick also adheres to this inclusionary
view and suggests that" '[gleneral scientific acceptance' is a proper condition for taking ju-
dicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence." McCoRMICK, supra note 39, at § 203 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that ap-
plication of the Frye test to hypnotic evidence may be inappropriate regardless of whether
the evidence is considered to be the product of the hypnotic procedure or of the witness'
memory. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Note, Frye Standard of "Gen-
eral Acceptance"for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of Balancing
Test, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875 (1979); Comment, Changing the Standard for Admissibil-
ity of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757 (1979).
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A. State v. Mack
Mack involved a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct and
aggravated assault. The victim of the crime, appearing "quite
drunk" and in a "flat emotional state".2 when she arrived at an
emergency room, apparently believed she had been injured in a
motorcycle crash, but could remember nothing between the time
of the purported accident and the time when she awakened at a
motel, accompanied by the defendant.0 The defendant's asser-
tion that the injury odcurred during sexual intercourse was dis-
puted by the medical intern on duty whose examination revealed
that the injury could not have occurred during intercourse.sl
Because of the confusion, the victim agreed six weeks later, at
the insistence of the Henamington County police department, to
undergo hypnosis in an attempt to recall the cause of her injury.
The hypnotic session was conducted by a lay, self-taught hypno-
tist employed by the police department and witnessed in part by
two Minneapolis police officers.- While hypnotized, the victim
revealed that -the defendant had actually attacked her with a
switchblade knife. 56 The defendant subsequently was arrested,
but before determination of probable cause, the trial court certi-
fied to the Minnesota Supreme Court the issue of admissibility of
the hypnotically induced recollection.
Rejecting the state's argument that the hypnotically induced
evidence was not the result of a scientific device but testimony
from human recall, the Minnesota court held that hypnosis af-
fected not only the credibility of the witness but the admissibility
52 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 766.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5s Id. at 767.
-6 Id. The police made an audio tape of the hypnotic session, but it had been lost by
the time of the trial. However, a transcript of the session typed by the police stenographer
was received into evidence and revealed the following:
Under hypnosis, Ms. Erickson reported that at the Hi Lo Motel David Mack
[the defendant] "told me to get on the bed and take my clothes off. He said, 'I
want to get even with you for running out on me."' As the hypnotist assured
her, "[y]ou will see it very plainly in your mind," but "you feel nothing," Ms.
Erickson said, "oh, no, no, no.... He told me to spread my legs,.... He
pulled out this switchblade and told me he was going to kill me... he kept
sticking the knife up me and I remember screaming and screaming."
[Vol. 70
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of the testimony as well.5 Following the rationale of the courts in
People v. Harper-" and Greenfield v. Commonwealth,59 the court
employed a Frye analysis, concluding that hypnosis is a scientif-
ically unreliable procedure and, therefore, that information un-
covered through hypnosis is inadmissible. ®
The Mack court's reliance on Harper and Greenfield is mis-
placed. While both of those cases did consider the scientific reli-
ability of hypnosis, that approach was necessary since the courts
were asked to determine the admissibility of actual results of sci-
entific procedures. In Harper, an order was granted to suppress
evidence elicited from the victim of a crime by both hypnosis and
sodium anobarbital ("truth serum"). While the hypnosis pro-
duced no useful information in that case and the order suppress-
ing that information was not challenged on appeal,6' the court
noted:
We see no reason to equate examination under hypnosis and
examination while under the influence of a drug having the ef-
fect of a so-called "truth serum" except to note that the scien-
tific reliability of neither is sufficient to justify the use of test
results of either in the serious business of criminal prosecu-
tion. 62
In Greenfield, the court held only that the scientific reliability of
hypnosis must be established before a third person can testify as
to what a subject said while hypnotized. 3 In Mack, by contrast,
the state sought simply to use hypnosis to refresh the witness'
memory, and not to introduce the results of hypnosis into evi-
57 Id. at 769-72.
58 250 N.E.2d5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
59 204 S.E.2d414 (Va. 1974).
6 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 771. It should be noted that the Mack court
recognized and rejected as "artificial and unprincipled any distinction between hypnot-
ically-induced testimony offered by the defense to exculpate and that offered by the
prosecution to make its case." Id. However, the applicable cases have not actually made
this distinction. It is true that the decisions can be divided along the prosecution-defendant
line, but this distinction is the result of the form in which the hypnotic evidence has been
presented to the courts by defendants, and not the result of any prejudice toward defen-
dants. To the contrary, it has been held in at least one case that the right to counsel may
include the right to a pre-trial conference with an attorney and the use of hypnosis to re-
fresh the defendant's memory. Cornell v. Superior Court, 338 P.2d 447 (Cal. 1959).
61 People v. Harper, 250 N.E.2d at 6-7.
6 2 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
63 204 S.E.2d 414. That court concluded that "hypnotic evidence, whether in the
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dence through the testimony of an expert hypnotist.
Consistent with the general rule that a witness who is capa-
ble of giving testimony with some probative value is allowed to
testify, the witness whose memory has been refreshed by hypno-
sis should also be allowed to testify. Any evidence of impairment
of the ability of the witness to accurately recall evidence, or of
suggestive procedures used in the hypnotic session, should affect
not the admissibility of the evidence, but only the weight given to
the witness' testimony by the jury.64 A requirement of full disclos-
ure of the hypnotic session and the circumstances surrounding it
would enable the adverse party to cross-examine the witness ef-
fectively and to challenge the hypnotic procedure."
B. State v. Hurd
In Hurd, the prospective witness suffered serious knife
wounds when attacked while she slept in an apartment she
shared with her husband and three sons. Although the victim
was unable to identify her assailant, the police considered as sus-
form of the subject testifying in court under hypnosis or through another's revelation of
what the subject said while under a hypnotic trance, is not admissible." Id. at 419. Ad-
mittedly, when in-court testimony under hypnosis, or evidence of what the subject said
while hypnotized, is in question, establishment of the scientific reliability of hypnosis may
be a prerequisite for admissibility. However, where the proffered testimony is the present
product of the human memory refreshed through the hypnotic process, the product of a
scientific test is not in question and the weight of authority indicates that the Frye test is
inapplicable. For an analysis of the authority on this point, see notes 35-36 supra and ac-
companying text.
The distinction between testimony from memory refreshed through hypnosis and
evidence which is the result of a hypnotic session, and the different treatment to be af-
forded each, is best exemplified by Creamer v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240. In Creamer, state-
ments made while the witness was under hypnosis were found inadmissible because the
court felt that the reliability of hypnosis had not been established. However, the in-court
testimony offered by the witness was not rendered inadmissible by the hypnotic sessions;
the fact that the witness had previously been hypnotized was merely one factor for the jury
to consider in determining the weight to be given the testimony. Id. at 241-42.
64 See People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d at 853.
6' See id. at 858. In Smrekar, defendant's objection to the testimony of the previously
hypnotized witness, as well as the court's decision, was based partly on the deprivation of
his right to cross-examine the witness effectively. However, the ability to cross-examine
the witness is one element which distinguishes the use of testimony from the previously
hypnotized witness from the impermissible use of evidence as to what the witness said
while under hypnosis. Although hypnosis can affect the witness' mind in a conscious way
that the cross-examination cannot reach, all witnesses are subject to similarly obscure
stimuli to some extent. Id.
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED RECOLLECTION
pects both the husband, who was at the apartment but asleep in
another room at the time of the assault, and the wife's former
husband, the defendant. 6
Shortly after the assault, the Somerset County prosecutor's
office arranged for the witness to undergo hypnosis in an attempt
to improve her recollection of the event. The hypnotic session
was attended by the witness, the two investigating officers and
two physicians, one of whom was a licensed psychiatrist. The
witness grew extremely emotional as she relived her experience
under hypnosis. When asked if the attacker was her current hus-
band she gave a negative response. But when the officer asked if
it was her first husband, the witness answered, "Yes."6s A week
later, the witness described her attacker to the police and named
the defendant as the guilty party.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress as unreliable the
witness' proposed in-court identification. The New Jersey court,
like the court in Mack, found the Frye analysis controlling. 69
After an extended review of the conflicting expert testimony of-
fered in the case, the court concluded that the hypnotic proce-
dure had been generally accepted as an aid to recollection"0 and
thus, in a limited sense, that hypnosis meets the standard im-
posed by Frye.71 Nevertheless, the court still found the hypnot-
6 414 A.2d at 293.67 Id.
68 Id. at 294.
69 Interestingly, the trial court did note the difference between evidence such as
fingerprints or blood samples and hypnotically-induced testimony. Although the court
realized the latter should be offered as recollection refreshed, it felt that the process by
which recollection was refreshed (hypnosis) must meet the Frye standard. Id. at 305. It
appears inappropriate to apply the Frye test once the distinction between refreshed recol-
lection and test results is recognized, especially when courts allow virtually any writing to
be used as a memory refresher.
70 The court specifically stated:
[W]e are satisfied medical research has established that, to varying degrees, a
large portion of the population has the capacity to enter a hypnotic trance and
that hypnotized subjects who are directed to do so have the ability to concen-
trate on a past event and volunteer previously unrevealed statements concerning
the event.
Id.
71 Id. at 305. The Hurd court's ruling that hypnosis satisfies the Frye test as a recol-
lection improvement procedure does not render the "general scientific acceptance" anal-
ysis of hypnotically induced recall any more appropriate. In fact, the inconsistent conclu-
sions reached by the courts in Mack and Hurd exemplify the futility of applying the Frye
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ically induced testimony in this case inadmissible.72
The trial court in Hurd apparently found hypnosis sufficient-
ly similar to a confrontation identification procedure to require
compliance with the principles of United States v. Wade73 and
Neil v. Biggers,74 which addressed the issue of unfairness and
prejudice in overly suggestive "line-up" and "show-up" identifi-
cation procedures. The constitutional safeguards7- espoused in
these two cases require suppression of an in-court identification
of the accused if that identification has been tainted by a prior,
unduly suggestive confrontation or other type of identification
procedure, unless the totality of the circumstances renders the
identification reliable. Thus, because the hypnotic session con-
ducted by the state was unduly suggestive, 76 and sufficiently de-
void of the safeguards adopted by the court to ensure reliability,7
the identification testimony was held inadmissible.
test to hypnosis. The reliability, or lack thereof, of hypnosis is not subject to conclusive
proof. The very nature of the hypnotic phenomenon allows no "general scientific accep-
tance." Hypnosis involves one inherently ambiguous factor, the human mind, which is not
subject to complete explanation. Therefore, the source of the doubt surrounding hypnosis
will forever be replenished. See London, Ethics in Hypnosis, in GORDON, supra note 14, at
593-94.
72 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding and
agreed that the Frye analysis was appropriate. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
The court also did not demand that hypnosis be generally accepted as a means of obtaining
the "truth," but only that it be "able to yield recollections as accurate as those of an ordi-
nary witness," and that in an appropriate case, and if used properly, hypnosis could satisfy
this test. Id. at 92. The court concluded, however, that the nature of the hypnotic session
in the case at bar rendered the testimony inadmissible.
73 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
74 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
75 The safeguards of Wade and Biggers stem from the sixth amendment right to
counsel and the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
76 State v. Hurd, 414 A.2d at 307. The court reasoned that the witness entered the
hypnotic session having excluded her present husband as a suspect. It further reasoned that
the witness was told, while under hypnosis, that she would be able to identify her at-
tacker, and apparently she accepted that belief. Therefore, when the witness was pre-
sented with two suspects, one of whom she had in effect eliminated, the suggestive nature
of the questioning dictated that she identify the defendant as her assailant. Id. at 308. See
the text accompanying note 68 supra for a discussion of the line of questioning employed in
the hypnotic interview.
77 The United States Supreme Court in Biggers enumerated five factors to be con-
sidered in evaluating the reliability of a pre-trial identification: "[1] the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention,
[3] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation." 409 U.S. at 199-200. In addition to consideration of the
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In view of the reasoning behind Wade and Biggers, the ap-
plication of those decisions to testimony consisting of hypnotical-
ly induced recall is inappropriate. The Wade/Biggers rule was a
response to the Supreme Court's recognition of the possibility of
unfairness, prejudice and ultimately mistaken identification that
is inherent in confrontation identification procedures.78 Not only
are such procedures often suggestive in nature, they also present
a serious problem for the defense in convincing a jury of, or even
demonstrating to them, the unfairness of the identification pro-
cedure. 79 As the court stated in Wade, "the accused's inability ef-
fectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at
the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully
to attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom identifica-
tion."w
Thus the central problem addressed by the WadelBiggers
rule is deprivation of the right of the accused to have the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine effectively an identification witness. This
is not a problem, however, when hypnosis, rather than a con-
frontation procedure, is employed to aid the witness in identify-
ing the accused, provided that there is full disclosure of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the hypnotic session to the jury and the
opposing party. Accordingly, that rule is inapplicable to a hyp-
notically aided identification, and, with proper safeguards, a
witness should be allowed to make an in-court identification
based on his prior hypnosis.
CONCLUSION
The general rule for admissibility of evidence is that all rel-
evant facts are admissible, unless a specific rule provides other-
wise." The testimony of a previously hypnotized witness, when
above factors, the trial court in Hurd required compliance with other extensive procedural
safeguards as an initial prerequisite for the reliability of an identification stemming from
hypnosis. 414 A.2d at 305-06. Thus, in essence, the Hurd court adopted an approach
which subjects identification testimony to tougher scrutiny if the pre-trial identification
involved hypnosis rather than a "line-up" or "show-up" confrontation.
78 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-29.
79 See id. at 230.
80 Id. at 231-32.
81 1 WIMOR, supra note 38, at §§ 9-10.
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considered in accord with the weight of authority as testimony
from present memory refreshed through hypnosis, should not be
rendered inadmissible under the Frye rule, which prevents the
admission of scientific evidence the reliability of which has not
been established. Furthermore, the Wade/Biggers rule is not ap-
plicable to identification testimony stemming from hypnotically
induced recollection because full disclosure of the hypnotic pro-
cedure would give a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine
effectively a witness and to challenge the hypnotic procedure.
Thus, provided that the testimony of the previously hypnotized
witness is relevant, it should be admitted. Although particular
facts and circumstances surrounding the hypnosis interview may,
as in Mack and Hurd, cast doubt upon the reliability of the testi-
mony, these factors should bear only on the weight to be given
the evidence by the jury, and not on admissibility.
R. Eberley Davis
